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Freedom and the Self:  Essays on the Philosophy of David Foster
Wallace is  the  second  collection  of  essays  in  Wallace  studies that
approaches the author from a philosophical standpoint, and most of the
critics and students who look forward to reading this book have read the
first,  Gesturing  Toward  Reality:  David  Foster  Wallace  and  Philosophy
(edited Robert K. Bolgerand Scott Korb), published just one year before.
If that is the case for you, just know that this book is very different. It
mostly  concerns  itself  with  Wallace’s  undergrad  philosophy  thesis,
published in 2010 under the title Fate, Time, and Language: An Essay on
Free Will (also edited by Steven M. Cahn). With such focus, it manages to
make us more familiar with a side of Wallace’s we readers are not much
in contact with: his philosophical background not just in existential terms,
but in logical terms also. In this sense, I must say, my main critique to this
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collection is that the final two essays would have been much more in
context in a book like Gesturing Toward Reality. In here, they seem (at
least  relatively)  out  of  context.  My  opinions  aside,  let’s  look  at  the
content.
6
The first  essay,  William Hasker’s  “David Foster  Wallace and the
Fallacies  of  ‘Fatalism’”  treats  Wallace’s  philosophy  honors  thesis,  one
devoted “to the issues raised by Richard Taylor’s paper ‘Fatalism.’” In
considering  the  topic,  Hasker  chooses  this  structure:  1)  presenting
Taylor’s argument; 2) presenting “a selection from the criticisms made of
it;” 3) presenting “a summary of Wallace’s system” and his criticisms of
Taylor; 4) comparing Wallace’s criticisms to those of the past, showing
whether or not they provide innovative ideas; 5) introducing how “these
problems present themselves in our own time.”1
7
In short, Richard Taylor deduces fatalism from a set of six universal
presuppositions in contemporary philosophy,  coming to the conclusion
that in modal reasoning the way we think about the past also applies to
the future: on the one hand, a captain’s order to battle tomorrow will
make the occurrence of the battle a necessary condition; on the other –
given P5 (the fifth philosophical presupposition)2, “in the absence of the
necessary condition (i.e. the battle), […] it is not in my power to issue an
order to battle tomorrow, […] I have no control over which sort of order I
will  issue.” A fatalist,  then, is one who “thinks he cannot do anything
about the future. […] [One who] thinks that even his own behavior is not
in the least within his power” (2).
8
Of  all  the  criticisms  Taylor  had  to  face,  the  only  one  he  ever
acknowledged was the one brought forth by Steven M. Cahn – editor of
this collection! –, who argued that Taylor’s “original motivation . . . to
support the Aristotelian conclusion that future contingent propositions
lack classical truth values” (8) did not yield the results Taylor himself
hoped for. Cahn pointed out that Taylor, in fact, was not a fatalist and that
his paper was written in the form of a reduction ad absurdum. The real
point of Taylor’s argument was not to promote fatalistic thought, but to
challenge philosophers to point out relevant differences between what we
take  for  granted  (fatalism  concerning  the  past)  and  what  we  find
disgusting and absurd (fatalism concerning the future). Taylor was right,
we’re lacking in answers, but his thesis created what seemed to be the
monstrous, and irresolvable, problem of fatalism. 
9
So  Hasker  concentrates  on  Wallace’s  attempt  to  offer  “new
objections that are more successful than those made previously” (16) to
the problem of fatalism. When most have tried to reject Taylor’s argument
by  disallowing  his  presuppositions,  Wallace  will  grant  him  his
presuppositions and “show that the conclusion [Taylor] desires still does
not follow validly from that argument” (18). And where philosophers have
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usually relied on intuition, Wallace will construct a logical/formal/modal
system to ground his thesis. 
10
Or at least those were the intentions. There’s no way to summarize
Wallace’s system here, so I’ll just leave you with Hasker’s conclusions on
Wallace’s response to Taylor’s argument:
11 On the one hand, his creation of System J, and his articulation
of  his  reply  to  Taylor  in  terms  of  that  system,  must  be
recognized as a splendid achievement. […] On the other hand,
his claim to have pointed out a fundamentally new objection,
quite different from those made previously, and his claim to
have granted Taylor’s premises and shown his argument to be
invalid cannot be sustained (23).
12 The second essay, Gila Sher’s “Wallace, Free Choice, and Fatalism,” starts
by  noting  that  Wallace,  in  his  2005  commencement  address  later
published under the title This Is Water, extolls the value of “freedom of
choice regarding what to think about” and focuses “on how, in order to
cope with life, we have to decide actively to see it in ways that will not let
it crush us.” Sher’s shrewd (because unusual in Wallace Studies) intuition
is that “the view that we cannot change reality, we can only change the
way we think about it is,  in a way, a form of fatalism” (32).  And yet,
twenty years earlier  Wallace argued against Taylor’s  argument,  which
“supported fatalism in a rather unusual way, namely, on general logical
and semantic grounds” (32). In this sense, Sher’s “goal in this paper is to
reconstruct Wallace’s critique of Taylor’s argument for fatalism in a clear
and concise way, so that it is easy to see its main line of reasoning and
potential power” (32). 
13
Here’s how  Wallace  reflects  on  Taylor’s  argument:  it  is  clearly
logically valid in the sense that its conclusions rightfully result from its
premises;  but  these  premises,  i.e.  the  six  “universally  accepted”
philosophical  presumptions,  are  not  purely  logical:  the  truth-value  of
premises 1 and 2 “is not attributable to pure logic” (35). It then follows
that Taylor’s argument is not a purely logical one. “Wallace, therefore,
rightly understands  Taylor’s  argument  as  (or  as  intended  to  be)  a
“semantic,” or a logico-semantic, argument rather than either a logical or
a  metaphysical  argument”  (35,  my  emphasis)  and  concludes  that  “if
Taylor and the fatalists want to force upon us a metaphysical conclusion,
they  must  do  metaphysics,  not semantics”  (36).  This  is  why  Wallace
methodologically  proceeds  by  pointing  out  and outlining  the  “implicit
nonlogical modalities, causal relations, and time indices” (42) that affect
Taylor’s  system  and  provide  “fertile  ground  for  ambiguities  and
equivocations” (42). These lead Wallace to successfully prove (in Sher’s
estimation) that “Taylor’s premises do not force fatalism upon us” (46).
14
The third essay, M. Oreste Fiocco’s “Fatalism and the Metaphysics
of Contingency” is a brilliant, precise, and enlarging discussion on the
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subject of the first two essays. It brings the matters of fatalism, Taylor,
and  Wallace  into  the  wider  context  of  Western  metaphysics  and  the
history  of  philosophy  in  general.  This  is  important  –  Fiocco  thinks  –
because  the  whole  discussion  at  hand  contains  various
misunderstandings.  The key here,  again,  is  that “Taylor .  .  .  does not
accept  fatalism.  […]  Following  Aristotle,  […]  he  deniesthat  every
proposition  whatsoever  is  either  true  or,  if  not  true,  false”  (62,  my
emphasis).  Therefore,  Fiocco  states:  “many  of  those  who  have  been
critical of Taylor . . . have simply misunderstood his project and the basis
of his Aristotelian argument” (63). 
15
These misunderstandings are to be traced back to two different
conceptions of metaphysics, the contrast of which affected many strands
of philosophy. When Taylor’s argument first came out (in the ‘60s), “it was
orthodox that the only modalities pertinent to philosophy were linguistic.
[…] On this understanding, much of the basal structure of reality . . . is a
result of the interaction with the world of the minds of conscious beings”
(64-65). Taylor instead stood on an understanding of the world rooted in
Aristotle. In this, “the basal structure of reality is entirely independent of
the minds of conscious beings” (65), reality is clearly not linguistic, but it
is neither based on causal nor physical modalities, and this is where –
Fiocco contends – all of Taylor’s critics have failed to engage with his
argument, including Wallace, who “recognizes the need . . . to get clear
on the modality  relevant  to  Taylor’s  discussion,”  but  makes the same
mistake his  predecessors had made:  that  of  considering the pertinent
modality as physical and causal. 
16
Nonetheless,  “he  examines  with  more  determination  than  his
predecessors” the modal connections inherent to Taylor’s argument and
in  so  doing  “enables  one  to  discern  the  crux  of  Taylor’s  Aristotelian
argument” (72): Taylor assumes that the world is ontologically
homogeneous,  meaning time is not a matter of  concern.  Wallace sees
ambiguities  in  Taylor’s  treatment  of  time  and  formulates  The  Taylor
Inequivalence;  successfully  showing “that  there are two [inequivalent]
ways  of  understanding  [Taylor’s]  conclusion,  one  consistent  with
contingency, one not” (76). This should, in theory, disprove fatalism. And
yet, Fiocco warns us, Wallace “has not undermined Taylor’s argument”
(76), because Taylor and Wallace start from “incompatible assumptions
about the nature of contingency” (77), one physical-cum-causal, the other
Aristotelian. 
17
In  fact,  Taylor’s  two  foundational  ideas  are  an  Aristotelian
conception  of  metaphysics  (reality  based  on  the  nature  of  things  in
themselves)  and  his  denial  of  synchronic  possibility.  The  proper
interpretation of  his argument,  for Fiocco,  turns on this latter notion.
Taylor presupposes that states of affairs at a present moment must be as
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they  are,  in  other  words:  necessary.  Wallace  and  pretty  much  all  of
Taylor’s contemporaries found this reasoning faulty. 
18
But  what  Taylor  wanted  to  show  was  that  his  Aristotelian
understanding of the world, when tied to the six popular philosophical
assumptions  we  referred  to  multiple  times,  was  incompatible  with
contingency. Specifically, he argued that certain propositions about the
future  turn  out  to  be  indeterminate  and,  therefore,  at  least  one  of
contemporary philosophy’s popular assumptions turns out to be mistaken.
3 This is the one essay that explains most clearly how and why Taylor
wasn’t  a  fatalist.  In  doing  so,  though,  Fiocco  could  have  been  more
precise on the difference between Aristotelian and physical-cum-causal
views of the world; this point, I think, comes as rather cloudy, and it being
the point of departure of his argument, one is left with the sensation of
having understood almost everything. 
19
The fourth  essay,  Maureen Eckert’s  “Fatalism,  Time Travel,  and
System J,” connects Taylor and Wallace to David Lewis’s theories about
time travelling. The connection is found in Taylor’s responses to what is
termed “Ability Criticism.” This is the criticism of the fifth premise of
Taylor’s  argument  –  “no  agent  can perform any given act  if  there  is
lacking, at the same or any other time, some condition necessary for the
occurrence of that act” (my emphasis) – brought forth by Aune, Saunders,
and Abelson on the different meanings of can. These critics argued that
Taylor’s argument fails because individuals retain the ability to do even if
circumstances do not permit certain actions to occur; but Taylor was able
to dispense with “Ability Criticism” by showing that whatever argument
his critics were implementing could as easily be applied to fatalism about
the future as to fatalism about the past. In other words, that if one were
to apply his critics’ argument, one would have to argue that people could
change the past. 
20
And, Eckert tells us, the problem of disambiguating the senses of
“can” is not so easily solved. Taylor noted that his critics differentiated
between three senses of “can”: (1) “what is within one’s power to do, (2)
what is possible for one to do, and (3) what is within one’s ability to do”
(96). Taylor got rid of (3) (= Ability Criticism), but that still left open the
question of specifically defining the other two senses of can.
21
“David  Foster  Wallace  exploits  this  remaining  ambiguity  in  his
attack  on  the  fatalist  argument,  disambiguating  these  two  remaining
senses of ‘can’ through distinguishing between physical possibility and
what he terms ‘situational physical possibility’” (96). This is where Eckert
introduces David Lewis.
22
“In  ‘The  Paradoxes  of  Time  Travel,’  David  Lewis  attempts  to
dissolve [the ‘Grandfather’] paradox with the intention of showing that
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[time travel] is possible” (97); the “Grandfather Paradox” is the following:
if a person has successfully travelled back in time, owns a gun, and is
aiming that gun at her grandfather, “there is nothing at that time that
would prevent her from killing her grandfather” (97). In other words, a
person  is  moving  through  a  continuous  now  (we  always  live  in  the
present),  which  means  she  can kill  her  grandfather  (Lewis  calls  this
notion of time “personal time”). On the other hand, if we consider the
concept of “objective time,” that person has travelled to the past, and by
killing her grandfather “she would then eliminate a necessary condition
for her existence—there would be no future her that can travel back in
time to commit the act in question” (97).  In this analysis,  (1) Lewis’s
“objective time” equals Wallace’s “physical possibility,” a realm in which
the time traveller can’t kill her grandfather; (2) Lewis’s “personal time”
equals Wallace’s “situational physical possibility,” here the time traveller
can kill her grandfather.
23
For Wallace, therefore, the key to undermining Taylor’s argument is
in the analysis of the senses of can. Specifically, Wallace wants to show
that  premise  five  is  incoherent  with  Taylor’s  conclusion,  therefore
rendering his argument invalid. With System J, Wallace builds a theory
which  grants  “alternative  logically possible  presents”  (104)  but  no
alternative “physical and actually possible” (105) presents to show that
while it is true that in Taylor’s conclusion no agent could perform any
given act if there wasn’t, at the same time, the condition necessary for
the occurrence of that act, it is not true that no agent could perform any
given act if there wasn’t, at any other time, the condition necessary for
the occurrence of that act.
24
The fifth essay, Daniel Kelly’s “David Foster Wallace as American
Hedgehog”  provides  the  necessary  context  as  to  why  and  how  this
discussion relates to larger matters in Wallace Studies. Kelly looks for
Wallace’s “one big thing” amongst his wide range of interests and, of
course, Wallace’s one big thing is free will/choice. But Kelly’s essay lacks
the philosophical/logical imprint that so peculiarly characterizes the book
and therefore,  to me, ends up not being a convincing addition to the
collection mostly,  I  think,  with regards to  selection and placement: it
might have worked best as an introduction.
25
That said, the essay notes that Wallace’s concerns – “language and
meaning; choice and the will; the self, selfishness, solipsism, and their
prospects for being overcome –, all emanate from a core concern with,
roughly, what it means ‘to be a real human being’ (MacCaffery 1993)”
(109). This is why, Kelly goes on, both in all of the fiction and non-fiction
Wallace confronted “the ways in which problems connected to choice
presented themselves to those of us living in the turn-of-the-millennium
United States” (111). 
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As we all  know,  this  was Wallace’s  main concern.  Reflecting on
human beings and their need to find meaning,  Wallace structured his
ideas “into a schema made of three distinct, general components: (1) the
primal need or basic impulse to give away or invest, (2) a sort of resource
that is ‘given away’ or type of currency that a person is driven to invest,
and (3) the objects at which the impulse might be directed, the vessels
with which the resource might be filled, into which the currency might be
channeled” (114). 
27
In contemporary times, human beings try to find a balance between
these three components, but the sheer amount of options and information
is overwhelming; plus the very idea of what Wallace called “choosing our
Temple” is regarded with deep suspicion. “Ideological passion disgusts us
on some deep level” (120), and this creates a split inside us, between our
innermost need of giving ourselves away and our intellectual cynicism
about such a notion. Finally, all of these problems (which Wallace directly
discusses  in  “E Unibus  Pluram”)  are  shown to  lead to  hedonism and
addiction, seen as a “kind of flight from the pressures of choice” (123). In
the  end,  Wallace’s  message,  for  Kelly,  “can  be  distilled  down to  two
simple words: wake up” (124).
28
The sixth and last essay, “David Foster Wallace on the Good Life” by
Nathan Ballantyne and Justin Tosi, follows Kelly’s approach in the sense
that it aims at reconstructing Wallace’s main philosophy in his life and
career, but it does so by offering both new themes and connections and
new approaches  to  previous  conversations  in  Wallace  studies.  In  this
case,  the authors “argue that his writings suggest a view about what
philosophers  call  the  good  life”  (133).   They  proceed  by  comparing
Wallace’s oeuvre with “popular positions from moral philosophy” and by
presenting Wallace’s reactions to “three positions about the good life.”
The first of these positions is ironism, which “involves distancing oneself
from everything one says or does and putting on what Wallace often calls
a ‘mask of ennui.’” The second is hedonism, which states that “a good life
consists in pleasure.” The third is narrative theories, according to which
“a good human life is characterized by fidelity to a unified narrative”
(134).
29
(1) For Richard Rorty, “a society of ironists can remain committed to
humane values by distinguishing between public and private justification”
(138). Even if the ironist is “never quite able to take [him]self seriously,”
he  can,  nonetheless,  commit  to  something  just  as  e.g.  people  would
commit to Christianity in the Middle Ages: without the need to ask why.
Wallace totally disagrees; to him a good life is one of serious commitment,
one  that  takes  itself  seriously.  Irony  is  to  him  just  a  flight  from
responsibility, a childish attempt to be beyond criticism. It leaves a huge
black hole inside the individual.
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(2)  Hedonism is  completely  and  utterly  rejected  by  Wallace  (in
Infinite Jest people stare at a screen until death by watching a movie so
pleasurable it ends up killing them). But thinkers such as Epicurus or
Bentham defended a theory called value hedonism according to which
“what makes pleasure valuable is not the feeling or sensation itself, but
our enjoyment  of  the sensation.  It’s  the attitude of  enjoyment that  is
crucial”  (141)  to  living  a  good  life.  In  other  words,  it’s  not  pure
sensational pleasure that counts; it’s finding pleasure in life itself. This is
better, because it permits (unlike ironism and “pure” hedonism) people’s
commitment to something, but it is still unacceptable for Wallace because
it constitutes a total egotistic approach to life. “On these theories, other
people are no more than mere objects in the state of affairs you value”
(144). The only value your friends have is directly proportionate to how
they affect your pleasure and your happiness. It’s a totally self-centered
view on life.
31
(3) The basic idea under narrative theories is that “someone has a
good life only if she has a narrative outlook on her life. […] She must see
her  life  as  making sense  as  a  single  story  in  which she is  the  main
character.”  Narrative theories  are subdivided into two categories,  the
“weak” thesis affirms that “having a narrative is a necessary condition for
a good life,” and the “strong” thesis that “a person simply is the thing
described by a narrative” (146). These theories avoid some of the pitfalls
of hedonism, they allow for a deeper and richer definition of human life,
where people can value commitments in friendships, family, work, and
ethics in general. But, first, Wallace rejects the “weak” thesis. Not only
people do not need narratives; narratives can be very dangerous:
32 To judge one’s life in terms of narrative success is to adopt a
certain  perspective.  This  perspective  involves  thinking  of
oneself  as  a  character  in  a  story,  and  evaluating  that
character in terms of her or his compliance with the story’s
demands.  If  this  sounds  alienating,  there’s  a  good  reason.
(156)
33 In  other  words,  narratives  can  turn  us  into  spectators  (rather  than
participants)  in  our  own lives.  We become the audience of  ourselves,
hyper-self-conscious. We distance ourselves from ourselves, we become
our own judges, we see ourselves falling short. This is the case in short
stories like “Good Old Neon” and “The Depressed Person” where the
protagonists hold fix idealized versions of themselves and self-destroy for
not being able to achieve them. But narratives, seen through the “weak”
thesis, also create another problem: “we tend to overvalue uniqueness or
specialness in narratives, and this leaves us feeling inauthentic” (151).
 We  “confuse  uniqueness  with  authenticity”  and  end  up  reaching  for
emptiness  or  for  versions  of  ourselves  that  turn  us  into  frauds.
Uniqueness has nothing to do with value, and our culture has forgotten
that.
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The “strong” thesis, instead – of which the major theorist noted is
Christine Korsgaard –, states that narratives constitute us, that “a person
is identical with her narrative. […] If you are your narrative, there’s no
way your narrative can alienate you from yourself. There’s no you without
it” (157). But, again, Wallace is in disagreement (and again “Good Old
Neon” is cited as a perfect example). It seems obvious, to Wallace, that
“we are not merely our narratives, […] because no narrative—perhaps
nothing  ever  explicitly  thought  in  words—can  capture  who  we  are.
Although narratives can usefully express to others and to ourselves what
we care about, they are never who we are. Selves are ineffable” (159).
35
All of these comparisons lead Ballantyne and Tosi to the following
conclusion – which, in a way, seems to become the whole collection’s
conclusion: Wallace, despite having a sincere attraction toward theories,
nonetheless finds them unsatisfactory. “Wallace recognizes that theories
of the good life, when taken to be more than limited sketches of reality,
tend to result in our being judgmental or cruel to ourselves” (162-163).
Theories are not reality, they’re just maps.
36
This collection presents, dissects, and explains that side of Wallace
we students of literature knew was there but never really understood. It
does it especially well by concentrating on a single specific matter and
offering different points of view, thereby providing the reader not with an
arbitrary reading/thesis/summary but with various elements he/she must
work with in order to grapple with this philosophical conundrum. It is by
the strength of its method, therefore, that Freedom and the Self: Essays
on  the  Philosophy  of  David  Foster  Wallace successfully  manages  to
engage and lead students of  literature into a field not  their  own and
enable them to understand logic and exactly why logic matters: it is one
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